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‘I’m afraid I’ve got some bad news for you.’ 
He looked questionably at me.
‘And what’s that, Mr Marsh?’ 
‘I’m terribly sorry but I’ve gone and operated on the wrong 
side,’ I said. 
He looked at me in silence… 1
INTRODUCTION 
Distinguishing right from left can be challenging. During 
basic clinical training, we grappled with distinguishing 
superior from inferior, proximal from distal, medial from 
lateral but did you ever consider that some individuals may 
have had difficulty in telling right from left? We make right / 
left (RL) decisions on an everyday basis.  Whether providing 
someone with travel directions or taking a car journey - 
laterality decisions are unavoidable. For many, discriminating 
right from left is an automatic process; an unconscious 
competency. However for a significant proportion of our 
population, distinguishing right from left is a complex task 
that requires conscious thought and effort.2 Regardless of our 
ability to discriminate right from left, all of us at some stage 
can get it wrong – to err is human.3
In many situations RL errors may lead to only minor 
consequences - such as providing the wrong travel direction. 
However in industries such as healthcare and aviation - RL 
errors can lead to significant harm.4-6  Interestingly it has 
been proposed that a laterality misjudgment may have been 
a contributory factor in the sinking of the Titanic “He turned 
the ship right instead of left and, even though he was almost 
immediately told to correct it, it was too late and the side of 
the starboard bow was ripped out by the iceberg”.7 
In this article, we will review some of the science behind RL 
discrimination and how this applies to healthcare. We will 
also consider some measures to prevent such laterality errors 
occurring. 
SPATIAL AWARENESS AND RIGHT LEFT 
DISCRIMINATION 
The neuropsychological process underlying RL discrimination 
is complex.8 Despite an increasing evidence base - much 
remains unknown. We will provide a brief overview of some 
of the neuropsychological processing. 
Spatial awareness considers an individual’s ability to 
maintain body orientation in relation to their surrounding 
environment9 – whether front or back, up or down, or left or 
right. Egocentric orientation considers direction in relation to 
one’s own body (e.g. either your right or left hand) and extra-
egocentric orientation applies to direction in your setting (e.g. 
the left or right hand of the patient sitting in front of you).10 
Research would suggest that, despite being a fundamental 
task, not everyone has the same spatial orientation 
capabilities.10 In terms of directions of spatial orientation, an 
individual will find more challenge in  distinguishing right 
from left than above from below or front from behind.11 
Our ability to differentiate left from right in ourselves (i.e. 
Fig 1.   Which side is the arrow on?
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in an egocentric context) begins in early childhood.12 By the 
age of 11 years, 50% of children can correctly differentiate 
left from right in others (i.e. in an extra-egocentric context). 
When distinguishing right from left, many higher cerebral 
functions are recruited including language (both receptive and 
expressive), memory, visuospatial processing and integration 
of sensory information such as visual stimulus.11 In addition, 
mental-rotation is often required in distinguishing right from 
left (i.e. when two individuals are facing each other - their 
right side is directly opposite your left side). This mental-
rotation function is thought to originate from the brain’s 
fronto-parietal region.11 
Many have theorised why some individuals are more 
prone to confusing right from left. One theory relates to 
the association between cerebral hemispherical asymmetry 
and increased RL discrimination ability: a greater degree 
of cerebral hemispherical asymmetry has been linked to an 
improved ability in RL discrimination.12 Schizophrenia has 
also been linked with cerebral hemispherical asymmetry and 
researchers have studied individuals with schizophrenia (and 
dyslexia) with the aim to identify specific genes that may be 
involved in handedness.13 Although a number of such genes 
were identified, it is felt likely that such a complex process 
is polygenic.13 
Gender has also been investigated as a factor associated 
with RL discrimination ability. Though the evidence is 
not conclusive, males would appear to show a greater RL 
discrimination capability compared to females.11 Such a 
finding could be explained by the fact that males tend to 
exhibit a greater degree of cerebral hemispherical asymmetry 
and visuospatial function.11 
There is no systematic evidence to indicate that handedness 
is associated with RL discrimination ability. Whilst some 
studies have reported that being right-handed is associated 
with greater RL discrimination ability, other studies have 
reported no difference.2,14 
WRONG SIDED ERRORS IN HEALTHCARE 
Unfortunately, wrong-sided errors occur in healthcare. 
Laterality misjudgments represent some of the most 
catastrophic errors in medicine.4,15 If a body part has a 
bilateral representation there is an inherent risk of performing 
surgery or procedure on the incorrect side of the body.  Very 
few surgical specialties escape the potential risk of wrong-
sided events occurring.4 Efforts by many organisations 
such as the National Patient Safety Agency and The Joint 
Commission have reduced such ‘never events’ – but they 
continue to occur.16,17 Last year, there were 179 wrong-site 
surgeries reported to Strategic Health Authorities in England 
and many of these involved RL disparity errors.18 
Surgical specialties, of course, are not the only clinical 
specialty where RL errors can occur.  Other reported events 
include eye injections, nerve blocks, radiotherapy and 
thoracentesis.4,18,19
Using a root-cause analytical approach, Millar et al quantified 
and explored wrong-sided thoracentesis.19 They concluded 
that such errors are frequently multifactorial in origin with 
human error as a common factor. 
They reported that the majority of events occurred on the 
patient’s right-side (i.e. where the thoracenteses should have 
occurred on the patient’s left-side). We theorise that right-
handed individuals (i.e. the commonest form of handedness 
– c.90% of the population) tend to prefer performance to their 
right-side or their ‘fluent side’. When making a RL decision 
in clinical practice (which is often subject to time pressures 
and interruptions) clinicians may therefore display laterality 
by subconsciously favouring their dominant side (e.g. their 
right-side) regardless of the actual side of the pleural effusion 
(e.g. the left-side).
Another common source of non-operative RL errors concerns 
requests for radiological investigations. The next time you are 
speaking to a radiographer, be sure to ask them how many 
times they have received requests to image the wrong side 
of a patient’s body! 
MEDICAL STUDENTS’ ABILITY TO 
DISCRIMINATE RIGHT FROM LEFT  
Very few studies have considered RL discrimination ability in 
healthcare professionals. In one study, a cohort of 290 medical 
students had their RL discrimination ability objectively 
measured using a psychometric test called the Bergen Right 
Left Discrimination Test (BRLDT).20 Results of this study 
revealed that medical students displayed a range of ability in 
discriminating right from left. The higher the BRLDT score 
the better ability to discriminate right from left. 
In this study, male students out-performed female students in 
RL discrimination but handedness did not appear to have any 
bearing on BRLDT test performance.  
In terms of orientation, the greatest challenge for medical 
students seemed to involve mental rotation where they had to 
discriminate right from left when directly facing an individual 
– i.e. the commonest orientation in healthcare when a doctor 
Fig 2. Can you spot the error?
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faces their patient (or viewing a standardised radiograph 
image). Interestingly, those students considering a career in 
surgery, compared to a career in GP or medicine, were more 
likely to have a greater ability at RL discrimination.20
WHAT STRATEGIES CAN INDIVIDUALS USE TO 
ENHANCE RL DISCRIMINATING ABILITY?
When objectively measured, individuals vary in their ability 
to correctly discriminate right from left11,20 so that some are 
more prone to making RL errors. Can individuals judge their 
own RL discrimination ability? Evidence would suggest that 
individuals perceived RL discriminatory ability is significantly 
associated with their objective ability in distinguishing 
right from left.20 However this is by no means an infallible 
assessment.  Many individuals with difficulty differentiating 
right from left use a diverse range of assistive strategies and 
techniques.20 Table 1 lists some of the various discriminatory 
strategies and techniques. One of the commonest techniques is 
demonstrated in figure 4.  Extending the left thumb at a right 
angle to the outstretched index finger forms the letter ‘L’ to 
identify the left hand and side.
Table 1. 
Range of ‘techniques’ that individuals use to aid their 
discriminating of right from left.20
Discriminatory technique 
category Example
Relates to a physical activity ‘Right hand used to strum a guitar’
Relates to a unilateral body 
feature
‘BCG scar on my right 
side’
Relates to a unilateral dress or 
accessory feature
‘Wear my watch on my left 
side’
Use of word association ‘Write with my right hand’
Do these techniques enhance an individual’s ability to 
discriminate right from left?  Evidence would suggest that 
despite using such techniques, individuals are still challenged 
in correctly discriminating right from left.20 What remains 
unknown however is whether individuals can be trained to 
improve their RL discrimination ability.
REDUCING RIGHT/LEFT ERRORS IN 
HEALTHCARE 
Adverse events can arise in clinical practice when errors and 
latent conditions become aligned.21 In a complex system such 
as healthcare, adverse patient events are often multi-factorial 
but one common recurring cause is human error.21 We will 
now consider some approaches that aim to reduce wrong-side 
errors occurring – these incorporate individual, system and 
cultural strategies.
LEARNING FROM THE “HIGH-RELIABILITY” 
INDUSTRIES 
In recent years, healthcare organisations have been 
increasingly looking to other (so-called “high-reliability”) 
industries such as commercial aviation and nuclear 
power22 for learning in error-prevention strategies.  For 
several decades, such industries have shown incremental 
improvement in operating safety and reliability by embracing 
a universal truth for human operators – to err is human.3 
In “high-reliability” industries, systems of working for 
human operators are relentlessly reviewed and redesigned to 
anticipate, prevent and mitigate for the absolute certainty of 
human error.  Healthcare professions, in contrast, have been 
slow to accept this truth and have lost ground.  In a world 
that increasingly expects error-free healthcare, we are now 
playing catch-up.
The aviation industry, following root-cause-analysis of a 
number of high-profile air disasters in the 1970s, began to 
appreciate the role of human error in airplane crashes.23 The 
predominant failure was increasingly identified as dysfunction 
of the human teams managing the crisis rather than technical 
aircraft failure per se.  Recurrent team failures included 
a breakdown in key skills such as leadership, situation 
Participants’ scores on the Bergen right-left discrimination test. 
*Scale of 0-144
Fig 3. Range of medical student’s scores in the Bergen Right Left 
Discrimination Test22
Fig 4. A commonly used technique to aid the discrimination of 
right from left. By placing the index finger and thumb at right 
angles – the letter ‘L’ is made on the ‘Left’ side.
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awareness, decision-making and interpersonal communication 
– such skills were termed Non-Technical Skills (NTS).24 
NTS can be defined as the ‘cognitive, social and personal 
resource skills that complement technical skills and contribute 
to safe and efficient task performance’.24 In 1981, United 
Airlines was the first airline to commence training for flight 
staff in NTS and the training was called Cockpit Resource 
Management (CRM)25,26 – by the mid-1990s, CRM had 
become Crew Resource Management (to include cabin crew) 
and it was a global standard across the industry.
The healthcare industry is increasingly realising the 
importance of NTS, in complementing clinical and technical 
expertise.  In 2003 psychologists, in conjunction with clinical 
anaesthetists, developed a taxonomy to describe the NTS 
relevant to safe and effective anaesthetic practice called the 
ANTS (Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills) Framework.25 
This framework was designed to help anaesthetists recognise 
and assess the non-technical performance of themselves 
and others.  Training courses to coach anaesthetic NTS, 
often employing simulation-based education (SBE), are 
now delivered throughout the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
Similar taxonomies have subsequently been developed for 
surgeons (Non-Technical Skills for Surgeons – NOTSS)27 and 
scrub practitioners (Scrub Practitioners’ List of Intra-operative 
Non-Technical Skills - SPLINTS).28
So how might a high-reliability industry tackle the problem of 
RL disparity?  The science of Human Factors would suggest 
a number of strategies to prevent RL errors including:29
• Education regarding risk awareness and meta-cognition
• Use of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) & Checklists
• Use of technology
• Training to encourage effective team-functioning
EDUCATION ON RL DISPARITY
The first step in addressing any error is to increase awareness 
amongst operators of the risk of the error and potential 
consequences. Wrong-sided errors continue to occur and these 
errors can be devastating for both the patient and the second 
victims, namely the healthcare professionals involved.30  Table 
2 lists some of the factors which may potentially contribute 
to RL errors (adapted and modified from Pandit et al, 2017)31
The term metacognition is defined as an “awareness and 
understanding of one’s own thought processes” and higher 
order thinking skills.  One of the main purposes of this 
article is to foster metacognition and self-awareness amongst 
practitioners that: 
• RL discrimination ability is not reliably automatic or 
intuitive for many individuals
• RL decisions are frequently critical
• RL decisions should be afforded appropriate conscious 
effort and diligence, and should be actively processed 
through working memory
WORKING MEMORY
The Multi-Store Theory of Memory32 would suggest that there 
are three states of memory; namely sensory, short-term and 
long-term stores.  The short-term memory is also referred 
to as the working memory and, in computing parlance, can 
be likened to an individual’s processor unit or home screen. 
The working memory also controls an individual’s conscious 
awareness and conscious thoughts.
The reality of the working memory is that it is capacity-
limited and that active short-term memories are fragile and 
easily displaced or forgotten.  Conscious thinking is also 
most effortful and to prevent mental overload, tends to be the 
least-preferred option particularly when busy.  We can often 
function quite efficiently and effortlessly on an intuitive ‘auto-
pilot’ setting.  Although, undeniably efficient, such intuitive 
performance unfortunately represents a trade-off against 
thoroughness and accuracy (The Efficiency-Thoroughness 
Trade-Off).33 Ability and reliability in RL discrimination 
varies between individuals and for some, RL decisions cannot 
be safely trusted to automatic performance.  The danger in 
RL decisions therefore comes from situations where we fail 
to engage our working memory and commit such decisions to 
an unconscious process. In turn, anything that impacts upon 
the working memory will jeopardise RL discrimination and 
make errors more likely.
The working memory is vulnerable to many potential threats 
such as acute stress, time-pressure, fatigue, distractions, 
emotional extremes and intoxication to name a few.
Table 2. 
Categorised factors that may lead to right left  
errors in healthcare
Operator 
factors
•	 High pressured environment
•	 Stress and time pressure
•	 Fatigue and/or hunger
•	 Novice operator or procedural 
uncertainty
•	 Poor handover or change of staff mid-
procedure
•	 Poor record-keeping or inappropriate 
use of abbreviations 
•	 Interpersonal difficulties and authority 
gradients 
Patient 
factors
•	 Patient sedation or confusion
•	 Language or communication difficulties
•	 Similar patient names
•	 Bilateral pathology
Procedural 
factors
•	 Distractions and background noise
•	 Excessive team numbers
•	 Checking failure
•	 Change in patient position
•	 ‘Leading’ environment layout 
•	 Side marking incorrect, erased, covered 
or transferred
‘When Right could be so Wrong’. Laterality Errors in Healthcare 7
UMJ is an open access publication of the Ulster Medical Society (http://www.ums.ac.uk).
The Ulster Medical Society grants to all users on the basis of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 
4.0 International Licence the right to alter or build upon the work non-commercially, as long as the author is credited 
and the new creation is licensed under identical terms.
DON’T DISTRACT ME!
Clinical tasks often occur in busy and challenging working 
environments.34 From the ambient noise of telephones and 
monitors, to verbal interruptions and competing demands, 
such tasks are often nested in complex environmental 
dynamics.  Distractions place an additional burden on 
working memory and jeopardise conscious RL discrimination. 
Evidence supports the theory that interruptions and 
distractions impact on an individual’s ability to discriminate 
right from left. 34  In a situation where an individual’s attention 
is divided between performing a task (such as discriminating 
right from left) and facing a distraction it is not surprising that 
the task may suffer. 
Educational and organisational frameworks in healthcare 
need to recognise the importance of human factors in our 
challenging working environments.  When making critical 
clinical decisions, such as marking a limb or performing a 
unilateral procedure, minimising interruptions and distractions 
is desirable.  In response to a number of distraction-related 
air disasters, the Federal Aviation Authority enacted “The 
Sterile Cockpit” rule in 1981 – this rule dictates that flight 
crews must refrain from all ‘non-essential conversation’, to 
minimise unnecessary distractions, during all critical phases 
of flight (such as during turbulence or when plane altitude < 
10,000 feet).35  A similar “silent theatre” procedure has been 
adopted in some operating theatres to minimise distractions 
during the critical phases of a surgical operation.  Those 
individuals who are prone to confusing right from left are 
likely to benefit from similar initiatives.  
Design of our clinical environments can also have an 
impact on human factors. In terms of socio-materialism (i.e. 
how material objects interact with our socio-function and 
dynamics) there is increasing use of physical spaces known 
as ‘distraction free zones / quiet areas’.36 Such areas signal to 
others that an individual is making an important decision (for 
example prescribing in a neonatal Intensive Care Unit). Such 
socio-material interventions may provide a safe sanctuary for 
those challenged in making RL decisions.
HUMAN SUGGESTIBILITY
Practitioners favour laterality procedures that play to their 
dominant side. The majority of individuals are right-handed 
so this would suggest that an RL error is more likely to 
occur in procedures that favour a left-handed approach. 
Such an unconscious drift may also be encouraged by other 
factors that play to human suggestibility.  Examples of this 
would be where the practitioner anchors to an incorrect 
handover of laterality or where the procedural environment 
is set-up in such a way that subconsciously guides the 
unwary professional to the incorrect side.  In the latter, such 
misleading cues can be very subtle where the practitioner 
is drawn, for example, to the side which is nearest, most 
spacious, uncovered, undraped or better illuminated, or 
when the room appears set-up to allude to a particular side. 
An example of this would be where the furniture, such as a 
procedure trolley or ultrasound machine, can seemingly act as 
an obstacle to one side and a misleading signpost to the other.
USE OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 
(SOP) & CHECKLISTS
Another safety strategy employed to great effect by high-
reliability industries is the formal Standard Operating 
Procedure, often used in conjunction with checklists. 
Assuming good design, an SOP is inherently safe by 
eliminating variation and confusion, and promoting 
predictability and consistency of performance.  
In an attempt to prevent wrong-site procedures in healthcare, a 
number of SOPs have been recommended or mandated within 
the NHS.  Some examples for the operating theatre include the 
Surgical Safety Checklist,37 ‘Stop before you block’ initiative 
for unilateral nerve blocks38 and skin-marking policies prior to 
surgery.  Given that RL errors are not restricted to operating 
theatres, SOPs are also increasingly available for unilateral 
non-surgical procedures and are already commonplace in 
procedures such as thoracentesis39 and eye injections.40 
Formal SOPs prevent and trap RL errors by a number of 
means:
Fig 5. A cautionary case where a child’s leg was marked ‘No’ for surgery but the ink transferred to the other leg when the legs touched each 
other. Dominique MA Knight and John H Wedge CMAJ 2010:182:E799. Used by kind permission of the Canadian Medical Association.
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• Command a ‘time-out’ or ‘pausing-practice’ prior to the 
procedure to force engagement of conscious thought in 
relation to correct side and site
• Seek to promote a distraction-free environment
• Recruit the team to ‘cross-check’ RL decision and reach 
collaborative consensus 
• Create an opportunity for challenge from patient or other 
staff 
The World Health Organisation launched a Surgical Safety 
Checklist as part of a “Safe Surgery Saves Lives” Initiative 
in 2008.37 The intention of the checklist is to promote team-
functioning and prevent surgical ‘never events’ such as 
wrong-site surgery and retained foreign objects.  At three 
points in any operation, the theatre team are obliged to stop 
and reevaluate against critical errors – the focus of two of 
these checks is to confirm that the imminent operation is 
progressing to the correct site and side.  Whilst this worldwide 
initiative has saved countless lives globally, ‘never events’ 
such as wrong-site surgery unfortunately continue to occur.4,18 
More research is needed to understand why errors still occur 
despite the use of safety checklists, particularly regarding the 
socio-cultural nuances of checklist practices.41 
USE OF TECHNOLOGY
Technology and other innovations are increasingly employed 
to provide additional layers of protection and safety in 
healthcare. One such example in relation to wrong-sided 
errors is the recommendation that thoracenteses should be 
performed under direct ultrasound guidance39 – the clinician 
must thereby objectively confirm the correct side by direct 
visualisation of the underlying pathology (e.g. a pleural 
effusion) at the time of the procedure.  In human factors 
parlance, the ultrasound technology in this example acts as a 
constraint - a constraint can be defined as “the state of being 
checked, restricted, or compelled to avoid or perform some 
action”.29
Laterality errors, though relatively infrequent, can also occur 
with radiological imaging and the reporting of such images42. 
The risk of potential patient harm from such errors can be 
significant.  In recent years, computer software has been 
developed to flag-up image reports where there appears to 
be a RL conflict.42 
TRAINING TO ENCOURAGE EFFECTIVE TEAM-
FUNCTIONING
In January 2000, a 70 year-old gentleman named Graham 
Reeves, underwent a left nephrectomy at the Prince Philip 
Hospital in Llanelli, Wales.43,44 It was only upon completion 
of the operation that the theatre team, with one exception, 
realised that Mr Reeves had undergone wrong-site surgery 
and that the ‘good’ left kidney had been accidentally removed 
in error.  Mr Reeves, despite a subsequent salvage operation 
and treatment with haemo-dialysis, died five weeks later. 
The one exception in the theatre team that day was a medical 
student – she had realised the error from a review of the 
imaging but had been unable to successfully challenge the 
surgical team as to their impending blunder.  Mr Reeves was 
a victim of an RL error because of an administrational error 
which had caused the wrong side of operation to be listed 
on the operating schedule – he also fell foul of an authority 
gradient.3,44 
Authority gradients represent power-differentials whereby 
an individual’s actual or perceived status will rank them 
within a power-hierarchy or ‘pecking order’. Problems 
occur where authority gradients are steep because the power 
gap becomes a block to communication and challenge for 
lower-status individuals.  Within the operating theatre, for 
example, surgeons tend to occupy top-status.  In the case of 
Mr Reeves, the authority gradients on that day were simply 
too insurmountable for the young medical student and the 
consequences were disastrous.45 Perhaps, through education, 
training to empower students and staff may be a worthy 
endeavor? 
By the late 1970s, the aviation industry was increasingly 
aware that authority gradients were ‘costing’ the industry 
several planes each year.  They realised that the solutions for 
success in an aviation crisis were much more likely to come 
from the team rather than from the top-dog captain whose 
brain was failing from mental overload.  The prevailing 
culture, at that time, of a steep flight-deck hierarchy was 
killing off the team.  The answer for regulators was to demand 
flatter authority gradients amongst flight-staff whereby, 
for instance, formal challenge of a senior was to be both 
permitted and expected.  Such a change in culture, along 
with other improvements in flight team performance, was the 
principal focus of CRM training.26 
It is a reality that competent individuals do not necessarily 
make competent teams.  In healthcare, one of the increasingly 
used resources for coaching team-skills and covering the 
principles of CRM is Simulation-Based Education (SBE). 
In SBE, a healthcare team can be safely exposed to a crisis 
scenario and their subsequent crisis-behaviours and team 
performance unpicked and critiqued during the formal 
debrief.  Interprofessional-based education, to mimic real-life 
healthcare teams, is desirable for achieving both fidelity and 
collaborative competency. More training to improve team 
dynamics and performance, akin to CRM, can only help to 
prevent and capture errors such as RL disparity and wrong-
site procedures. 
CONCLUSION
In recent times significant inroads have been made in 
reducing wrong-sided errors – however we should continue 
to strive and make such never-events truly never events. 
Reducing laterality errors requires a deeper understanding of 
human behaviors and their complex interplay with working 
environments, teams, systems and organisations. According 
to Greek mythology, Ariadne helped Theseus navigate 
Minotaur’s labyrinth by providing him with a ball of thread 
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to guide his way out. Using this metaphor, applying human 
factors knowledge (such as difficulty in RL discrimination) 
into the milieu of clinical practice, could act as the thread to 
help guide health professionals in minimising patient harm 
through error. To err is human and it is no longer right to be 
left in the wrong.  
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